The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: it is not true. Herman Cappelen The moral rights of the author have been asserted. First Edition published in Impression: 1. All rights reserved. No part of this. Liberating Content. The Inessential Indexical. Philosophy without Intuitions Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever Oxford University Press, forthcoming

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Muddled Intuitions and Biased Intuitions. Whether one is convinced by its conclusion or not, Philosophy Without Intutions represents a clear jolt to contemporary metaphilosophical orthodoxy.

Philosophy without Intuitions – Hardcover – Herman Cappelen – Oxford University Press

So which lower-order properties qualify as test ibtuitions depends on which philosophical claim that experiment is, in the first instance, aimed at testing. Oxford Scholarship Online This book is available as part of Oxford Scholarship Online – view abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level.

Want to Read saving…. Philosophy without Intuitions Herman Cappelen No preview available – I can still give the body an autopsy further investigation.

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Some of these issues are cursorily treated, but this is intentional.

If the selected features are held to be constitutive of intuitions, it will be. William Sipes marked it as to-read Jan 21, While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: Fixing Language can be ordered at Amazon.

Two Potential Problems with Philosophical Intuitions: A Metamethodology of Intuitions. How Philosophers Use Intuition and ‘Intuition’.

Ignorance and Moral Obligation Michael J. Corbin marked it as to-read Jun 29, Haug in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

Philosophers’ use of ‘intuitive’ I: But the gloss on offer has so little face-value appeal that it’s unclear why he bothers with it. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: Jhc rated it really liked it Mar 18, He works in philosophy of language, philosophical methodology and related areas of epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy intuitios mind.

Philosophy without Intuitions

Examples are easily multiplied. Preston added it Apr 02, If I were to teach a graduate class on assertion, many if not all of these essays withouut be required reading.

Authors Affiliations are at time of print publication. This discussion has some independent interest and entertainment value but, to my mind, it’s way too long.


This book is not yet featured on Listopia. What is the point?

Corin Suta marked it as to-read Sep 04, The pace is fast, the style is witty, a wealth of interesting issues are raised in only pages. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: Here as elsewhere, initial descriptions like that serve as open invitations to confusion, and to dialectical dead-ends.

University Press Scholarship Online. Later on, having ‘a distinctive phenomenology or intuitioons or both’ gets added to the original list The Inessential Indexical is available at Amazon. More importantly, it’s unclear what motivates certain pairings e.

Philosophy without Intuitions – Oxford Scholarship

I’ll touch on these points again below but lack the space to discuss them in detail. The Impossible Mark Jago. Leo Horovitz marked it as to-read Nov 08,